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The regulatory environment and corporate governance in China are weak and 
vulnerable, and severe agency problems between owners and managers and between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders appear ubiquitously among listed 
companies. The value of cash holdings reflects how much value the investors attach to 
cash reserves. In the context of weak investor protection in China, we can expect the 
investors can largely discount market value of cash holdings. Venture capitalists’ 
engagement in IPO and post-IPO corporate governance have deepened while China’s 
stock market grows substantially in recent years. We hypothesize that venture 
capitalists could mitigate the risk that insiders transfer cash holdings into their private 
benefits through monitoring managers’ behavior and signaling to the investors.  
We examine a sample of China’s listed companies for the period 2006-2011 and 
find that venture capitals have been showing more presence in the A-share market, esp. 
in the hi-tech industry. Mean and median tests strongly support that differences exist 
between VC-backed and non VC-backed firms in terms of financial characteristics, 
VCs are more inclined to invest in start-ups and companies at growth stage. To 
compute excess cash holdings, we apply three models on the panel data and the firm 
fixed effects model survives in Hausman test and B-P test. Moreover, we conduct 
seemingly unrelated estimation between different groups and confirm that the value 
investors place on the excess cash holdings for VC-backed firms is significantly larger 
than their non-VC-backed peers. Further, we group VC-backed firms based on VCs’ 
characteristics and assess the difference between groups with respect to investors’ 
valuation on excess cash holdings. Our results highlight that among four 
characteristics we use, only VC’s reputation influences the value of cash holdings. 
Whether the VC is jointly investing with another VC, is funded by foreign institutions 
and holds share above the median will not affect investors’ valuation. In the end, we 
define cash in an alternative way and also examine the potential endogenous problem 
and validate the robustness of our findings.  
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除上述问题外，我国上市企业的 CEO 还存在着较强的政治关联，约有 27%























第 1 章    绪论 
因而总量上也会有很大的提升。这样就为我们提供了广泛的研究素材。 
国外关于风险投资和研究已经非常成熟。涵盖了 IPO 折价、IPO 长期业绩、
IPO 后管理、IPO 退出、关系网络等多个方面。国内对于风险投资的研究较多的
关注在 IPO 企业表现之上，关于风险投资与 IPO 折价、长期表现等问题的研究









Pinkowitz, Stulz, et al. [2]的研究开始，关于现金持有动机、现金持有价值的文献已
经非常之多。涉及到代理成本、信息不对称、公司治理、融资约束等多个理论领
域。国外来看，Pinkowitz 和 Williamson [21]研究了企业的投资机会及其可预测性，
股东债权人冲突的程度，以及企业是否面临融资约束这几个因素对企业现金持有
价值的影响。Faulkender 和 Wang [22]研究了企业财务政策的不同带来的企业现金


































































































































第 2 章    文献综述 
第 2 章    文献综述 
















现金持有的最早模型可以追溯到 1952 年 Baumol 提出的存货模型[28]，它运
用了交易成本的观点。而企业现金持有微观领域实证检验的成熟之作则是 Opler, 
Pinkowitz, Stulz, et al. [2]的文章，它从实证的角度验证了多种影响企业现金持有水
平的因素。自此之后的文章大多采用这个模型，或者根据实际情况进行修正。我
国的大多模型都是基于他们的模型，加入了我国一些特有的制度背景或者因素。 
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